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David Walsh’s Anamnesis of 
Modernity: A Preface to a Preface
The Crisis of Modernity Has Been Called Off
With the publication of The Modern Philosophical Revolution: The Luminosity of Existence, David Walsh has completed 
his trilogy of the modern world that also includes After Ideology: 
Recovering the Spiritual Foundations of Freedom and The Growth 
of the Liberal Soul.1 One might characterize Walsh’s trilogy as 
nothing less than an anamnetic recovery of our humanity in the 
modern world, as he suggests in another venue:
Anamnesis is therefore the recovery, not of a past, but of the 
present of a conversation that is perpetually available because 
its fullness is there in every moment from the beginning to the 
end. What is called forth is not a retrieval from the past but an 
1 David Walsh, After Ideology: Recovering the Spiritual Foundations of 
Freedom (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1990) (abbreviated hereinafter as 
AI); The Growth of the Liberal Soul (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri 
Press, 1997), (GLS); The Modern Philosophical Revolution: The Luminosity 
of Existence (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008) (MPR). 
Other works discussed in this volume include: The Third Millennium: 
Refl ections on Faith and Reason (Washington, DC: Georgetown University 
Press, 1999) (TM); Guarded By Mystery: Meaning in a Postmodern Age 
(Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2000); “Editor’s 
Introduction,” in Eric Voegelin, Anamnesis: On the Theory of History and 
Politics, Collected Works, Vol. 6, trans. M. J. Hanak and Gerhart Niemeyer, 
ed. David Walsh (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2002), 1–27 
(A); “Eric Voegelin’s Place in Modern Philosophy,” Modern Age Vol. 49, No. 
1 (Winter 2007): 12–23 (EV). 
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enlarged awareness of what is already present as the possibil-
ity of the encounter itself. . . . The only measure available is 
that which emerges in the test of existence itself. An existen-
tial mode of philosophy consists in the encounter with Being 
from which the language of being originally sprang. Anamne-
sis in the modern context must become a recovery not simply 
of knowledge but of reality (A 17–18).
Walsh’s anamnesis moves among modernity’s three pillars: 
rights, science, and the turn to existence (MPR xii). All three vol-
umes consider these three pillars with varying degrees of inten-
sity. Additionally, his refl ections within these volumes are of ne-
cessity circumscribed by these pillars because they are not to be 
understood as concepts, but rather as the core of a practice whose 
nature is intimated only in its unfolding; or, as Kant explains, our 
consciousness of the dispositions to virtue can only be known in the 
effect they have on the mind.2
In After Ideology, Walsh explained how the “critique” of mo-
dernity can only be made by passing through its deepest evils, and 
making the existential ascent beyond its horrors. Thus its keenest 
critics, Dostoevsky, Solzhenitsyn, Camus, and Voegelin bore wit-
ness to its horrors while affi rming human dignity. The Growth of 
the Liberal Soul treats the liberal tradition as a series of existential 
evocations of human dignity. There is no such thing as a liberal 
“philosopher” because the core of liberal thinking is the evocation 
and practice of dignity, not the discovery of doctrine. Walsh turns 
the incapacity of liberal thinkers to provide a complete defense, 
usually seen as its weakness, into the source of its strength.
The third volume sheds the deepest light on modernity by focus-
ing on the third pillar, the turn to existence, because it illuminates 
what is going on when one ascends from ideology (AI) and when the 
liberal soul “grows” (GLS). The Modern Philosophical Revolution is 
a meditation on the activity of reason in partaking in the revelation 
of being itself. It is less an analysis of luminous experiences of order 
than a report on the unfolding of the tensions of existence. The fi rst 
2 MPR 69, citing Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 399.
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two volumes are “contained” within the third, but each contributes 
something signifi cant on its own terms. With these three volumes 
as a whole, Walsh has achieved nothing less than a clarifi cation of 
the meaning of “modern,” and locates this meaning not in the dog-
matic or abstract terms with which interpreters have become so 
familiar, but in the existential turn in which human beings become 
conscious of their participation in moral struggle and the boundar-
ies in which that struggle takes place. Modernity is philosophy, the 
endless quest for wisdom, articulated most clearly, and of necessity 
with a sense that no articulation can be adequate. Thus, Walsh’s 
work—and any account of it—must necessarily remain incomplete, 
only a preface.
Walsh shows the dominant narratives of modernity to be in-
adequate because each represents a form of closure. The standard 
narrative of modernity, as an advance on antiquity and Christianity, 
progressing toward a free and equal regime based on the scientifi c 
method, is inadequate because it prophesies an end of history. Fur-
thermore, apocalyptic lamentations that technology is our fate are 
also inadequate because the people making these proclamations 
forget that such lamentations are based on a perspective beyond 
technology and the calculus of effective causes. Critics of moder-
nity skirt around its core by claiming that modernity is: a project to 
“lower the goals” of political order (Strauss); an idealistic Gnostic 
revolt (Voegelin); or technology (Heidegger). Proponents are mis-
led in holding up the scientifi c method (Bacon), democratization, or 
historical progress and objective knowledge (Kojève) as the mean-
ing of modernity.
Rather, the existential turn in modern philosophy consists of 
an intensifi cation of the desire to “stand in the light of being that 
must regard anything less than itself as mere counterfeit” (MPR 
70), while recognizing perpetually that our efforts to stand in the 
light of being are necessarily incomplete. The modern existential 
turn—begun by Kant and articulated most profoundly by Kierkeg-
aard, practiced most profoundly in the liberal political form, and 
redeemed from its deformations most successfully by thinkers and 
novelists such as Voegelin, Dostoevsky, and Solzhenitsyn—consists 
of a deepened understanding and practice of Aristotle’s insight that 
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the road to completing our human nature is a form of immortaliz-
ing.3 Walsh compares Aristotle’s assertion with Kant’s observation 
that “[v]irtue so shines as an ideal that it seems, by human stan-
dards, to eclipse holiness itself, which is never tempted to break 
the law.”4 Modernity represents a deeper awareness of that holiness 
than Plato or Aristotle could articulate because of the ancients’ ten-
dency to speak of knowledge of being, instead of recognizing fully 
that being possesses us.5
The veracity of this claim will depend on how well Walsh shows 
the moderns to have shorn philosophy as a mode of existence from 
the ancient and medieval mode of thinking in terms of the four 
causes and its consequent tendency to objectify existence. More-
over, even if the moderns are successful, with deepened insight 
comes the seeds of its own deformation, as the critics of modernity 
have done so much to show. Modernity has produced the gulag, 
and modern philosophers have given in to errors including the in-
evitability of historical progress and the sovereignty of the scientifi c 
method. Walsh’s achievement has been to demonstrate the achieve-
ment of modernity while accounting for its deformations. While the 
Modern Philosophical Revolution demonstrates how the existential 
turn reveals a deeper meaning for modernity than these deforma-
tions reveal, the fact remains that many modern philosophers did 
in fact succumb to them, and Walsh recognizes the turn itself plays 
a role in its own deformation:
Each of the thinkers we will review struggled mightily with 
this new mode of philosophizing in which the challenge is 
to deal nonobjectively with what is nonobjective. To yield to 
the temptation to objectify what is nonobjective is to lose the 
emerging luminosity. . . . What could be more tempting than 
to draw the whole within the mastery of the self? The glam-
our of the project can be broken only by the awareness of the 
falsity of the instrumentalization of all truth, for everything 
3 MPR 70, citing Nicomachean Ethics 1177b30.
4 MPR 69–70, citing Metaphysics of Morals, 396–97.
5 Inadequate too is the medieval distinction between natural reason and 
faith.
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can be assigned a price only if there is that which is beyond 
all price. The urge to reach such defi nitive possession of truth 
that it renders all further quest for truth obsolete can often 
prove too powerful (MPR 9).
Just as the immortalizing activity of the philosophers includes 
within it the deformation that the philosopher is somehow self-suf-
fi cient, and just as the Christian differentiation of reality includes 
within it the Gnostic deformation, so too the modern turn to exis-
tence includes within it the overconfi dence that the philosopher’s 
intense focus on the moral law (e.g., Kant’s comment that virtue is 
higher than holiness) leads him to forget that he too is human and 
not an Übermensch. His intense focus on the moral law can induce 
him to concoct ideological constructions of society and history be-
cause he “can allow himself the luxury of ancillary historical obser-
vations” (MPR 51, n.18). His focus on the horizon of moral action 
undermines his political prudence, as seen with several of the phi-
losophers Walsh considers in the Modern Philosophical Revolution. 
The modern philosopher’s focus on Being includes the possibility of 
making oneself oblivious to beings. Walsh claims that the deforma-
tions of modern ideology cannot be taken as derived from modern 
philosophy. Perhaps. But the superhuman effort to act according 
to duty and not in the hope of reward cannot be expected for the 
majority of human beings. This is why Augustine distinguishes be-
tween the carnal understanding of God’s justice, which looks to his 
rewards (including eternal life), and the spiritual understanding of 
justice, which looks to God himself as its reward. To formulate the 
problem of modern philosophy’s wager in defi cient but still useful 
scholastic terms, the virtue demanded of the modern appears theo-
logical, not natural, or perhaps it is monkish, not political.
This is why Kierkegaard is at the “end” of the modern philo-
sophical revolution that Kant inaugurates. Kant formulates the 
moral law one would need to be superhuman to fulfi ll. Because 
Kant knew one could not in fact fulfi ll it, he struggled mightily to 
provide a reason we would wish to act autonomously while acknowl-
edging the paradox of having to provide a reason, if one exists. The 
difference between what the modern philosophical revolution re-
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veals (and what it transcends) is starkest in Kant. Kierkegaard con-
stitutes its greatest advance from Kant because he recognized the 
problem of fulfi lling the moral law, which is in fact impossible to 
fulfi ll, is actually a pseudo-problem, precisely because the moral 
law, as duty, is experienced at its deepest level as love. It is not we 
who obtain the ideal, but the ideal that achieves us, and thereby 
constitutes our freedom.
After Ideology
In his effort to recover the spiritual foundations of freedom, Walsh 
begins by identifying the crisis of totalitarian horror as the crisis 
of modernity. He cites Voegelin’s description of a crisis as “not that 
a breakdown has occurred, but that when this has happened the 
‘remedial forces’ that ought to restore order prove to be ineffective” 
(AI 90). A civilizational crisis occurs when it cannot bring itself out 
of its own breakdown. The modern crisis is the Promethean turn 
to technology: “The Faustian bargain, by which a vast new power is 
given us at the cost of the soul that alone can provide the wisdom for 
its use, is the problem that lies at the very beginning of the modern 
world” (AI 13). Walsh relies on Voegelin’s diagnosis of modernity as 
the “Gnostic divinization of human nature” to describe the crisis. 
He also notes the “countermovement within modernity, of dissat-
isfaction with power as a self-suffi cient principle” among thinkers 
lamenting the “disappearance of the classical and Judeo-Christian 
worldview” (AI 18). After Ideology, then, refl ects an ambiguity that 
Walsh clarifi es in subsequent volumes. In this volume, modernity is 
in crisis because it has ignored the “classical and Judeo-Christian 
worldview,” but representatives who have transcended the crisis do 
so by working through the logic of the crisis on its own terms.
Walsh looks to Solzhenitsyn, Dostoevsky, Camus, and Voege-
lin as representative thinkers who personally confronted the dark-
ness of the Faustian bargain and then transcended it. The virtue 
of Walsh’s analysis is the focus he brings to their existential search; 
theirs was an existential ascent that worked its way through the cur-
rents of modernity and into the light. Dostoevsky and Solzhenitsyn 
ascended from the false freedom promised by ideology to the true 
freedom of Christ; Camus and Voegelin ascended from that false 
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freedom to true freedom in a “Christian direction” but did not at-
tain it. Walsh characterizes each step of the ascent that starts with 
the identifi cation of the crisis that then transforms into catharsis, to 
diagnosis, to ascent, and to the restoration of order.
Metanoia or Platonic periagoge is central to each representa-
tive. Solzhenitsyn’s discovery that the “line between good and evil 
moves through the heart of each man” corresponds with his discov-
ery of the genuine freedom of the zeks, whose freedom runs deeper 
than that of the guards (AI 148–53) and Dostoevsky’s conversion 
upon recollecting the peasant, Marey (AI 66–67). Of Camus and 
Voegelin, Walsh emphasizes the stages and self-consciousness of 
their ascent. Voegelin writes in volume fi ve of Order and History: 
“The truth is in motion; even more, as we have seen, the motion is 
the truth.”6 Rather than signifying a deformed modern symbol that 
truth is “made,” this statement refl ects the insight of Aristotle that 
practical “knowledge merges into concrete action, and action is the 
truth of the knowledge; what separates the two is not the distance of 
subject and object but a noetic tension in the movement of being.”7
Already then, the topic of the trilogy is stated in After Ideology. 
This work differs from the second and third volumes by emphasiz-
ing the crisis of modernity, whereas the purpose of the Modern 
Philosophical Revolution is to resolve that crisis, which is to say 
that there never was a crisis in the strict sense of the term. Even so, 
Walsh already anticipates this resolution in the concluding chap-
ters of After Ideology, in which he outlines the defense of freedom 
and dignity in the liberal tradition that will be elaborated in The 
Growth of the Liberal Soul. The examples of Solzhenitsyn, Dos-
toevsky, Camus, and Voegelin, who ascended from their own caves 
from within those caves, serve as guides for Walsh’s own diagnosis 
and ascent from the crisis of liberalism.
After Ideology illuminates how it is that each of these repre-
6 Eric Voegelin, In Search of Order, Order and History, Collected Works, 
Vol. 5 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1987), 57.
7 Voegelin, Anamnesis, trans., Gerhart Niemeyer, (Notre Dame, IN: Uni-
versity of Notre Dame Press, 1978), 69, quoted in AI 227. We shall com-
ment below on Walsh’s assessment of Voegelin in general, and Anamnesis in 
particular, which Walsh edited for the Collected Works.
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sentatives ascends on his quest, and explains metanoia as the de-
termining factor of ascent. However, his focus on the externals of 
metanoia and the ascent leave its relationship to the wider modern 
world unclear. Walsh recognizes this when he admits, “the most 
diffi cult element to convey in articulating the foundation of moral-
ity is as we have seen in chapter 1, the sense of ultimate rightness 
that underpins it” (AI 194). The ascent is an experiential movement 
toward transcendent reality, but Walsh can say little more in this 
volume. The subsequent two volumes elaborate this movement not 
only for lonely representatives in the modern world, but as a way of 
characterizing the modern world itself. Along the way, Walsh will 
clarify how we gain “the sense of ultimate rightness that underpins” 
morality when its ultimacy is always beyond our grasp.
The Growth of the Liberal Soul
Walsh argues that the liberal constitutional tradition proves that 
what does not work in theory can work in practice. Like a pair of 
friends who constantly argue and bicker but for some unknown rea-
son remain friends, the liberal order persists despite a history of 
failures, from Locke to Rawls, to demonstrate its truth. As bicker-
ing friends cannot explain what attracts them to the other’s “cen-
tral fi re,” as Bertrand Russell said of his friend Joseph Conrad, so 
too the specifi c genius of the liberal order “is to have learned, in 
the greater absence of theoretical defenses, to rely more than most 
on an opening toward the fulfi llment inchoately present within it” 
(GLS 6). The liberal tradition is never in a position to give an ac-
count of its own foundations because its defenders are perpetually 
aware they are “steeped in the awareness of a crisis of order” (GLS 
105). The liberal tradition is not so much refl ective as it is evocative 
in the sense of evoking practical responses to civilizational crisis: 
“the refusal to entertain the ultimate implications of the collapse 
of order saps the disintegrating impulse long enough to allow the 
emergence of practical virtue to renew its strength” (GLS 105). The 
practical response to crisis is borne of a faith in the liberal order 
whose deepest elements need no elaboration. This means that “the-
ory and practice are mutually illuminating, neither taking place in a 
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self-contained realm apart from the other.”8
It would be hasty to say Walsh “saves” the liberal order by point-
ing to the priority of the practical over the theoretical, because in 
recognizing this priority one opens himself to further problems, es-
pecially when the lineaments of that relationship are not adequately 
understood (as they were not by the liberal thinkers Walsh exam-
ines). One of these problems is that liberals understand the priority 
of the practical as the sovereignty of technique (or scientism, which 
gets judged by its “success” in obtaining effi ciency) and progressive 
history. Let us consider two of Walsh’s examples, John Locke and 
J. S. Mill.
Locke is the quintessential liberal in this mode of theory and 
practice illuminating one another because he was as much philoso-
pher as polemicist in the English Civil War. To characterize him 
as a philosopher of crisis is an understatement, as the Civil War 
was only one of many problems facing the English polity during 
his lifetime and for the next fi fty years. Voegelin observes that the 
national death rate was so high in the fi rst part of the eighteenth-
century, due largely to the alcoholism of the “Gin Age,” that the rate 
of population increase in other European countries was roughly 
thirty times as high as that of the English.9 In contemporary times, 
one would have to look to Russia in the years after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union for a similar national suicide. Seen in this light, 
Locke’s demiurgic project is Herculean in scope—and precarious.
Walsh is virtually alone in seeing Locke, not as a crypto-deist, 
8 GLS 107. Walsh cites Voegelin and Alasdair MacIntyre as thinkers who 
have understood the interdependency of theory and practice (GLS 330n.3). 
He praises the Quentin Skinner school for establishing the importance of 
ideas and their historical setting, but criticizes it for overlooking the philo-
sophical character of that relationship as a quest for truth. While he does 
not cite Strauss and Straussians in this immediate context, his main criticism 
of the Straussian interpretation of liberal thinkers is that they overlook the 
“opening toward the fulfi llment inchoately present within it” (see GLS 6), 
which is to say they tend to interpret liberal thinkers as thinking they have 
achieved science.
9 Voegelin, History of Political Ideas, Vol. 6; Revolution and the New Sci-
ence, The Collected Works, Vol. 24 (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri 
Press, 1998), 150–53.
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Enlightenment rationalist, voluntarist, or mere pamphleteer, but as 
a serious philosophical mystic whose “faith is not arbitrarily willed 
but, rather, arises organically from a reason that knows its own in-
capacity to ground its presuppositions” (GLS 338n.9). His politi-
cal thought is situated within this broader Christian philosophical 
meditation. And contrary to the view of most who are more willing 
to regard Locke as some form of latitudinarian Anglican, Walsh 
points to a journal entry, where Locke can be forthright about his 
religiosity, that “miracles were to be judged by the doctrine, and not 
the doctrine by the miracles.” According to Walsh, Locke maintains 
the Christian tradition as the basis for the “circularity of reason” in 
his meditative unfolding of reason. The experience that is the “cen-
ter of Locke’s Christianity” is the genuine “effort of repentance” 
and the turn to the “law of faith [that] is allowed to supply the de-
fect of full obedience.”10
Yet, the peak of Locke’s meditation also reveals his inadequacy 
(or reveals his relationship to the “bad” modernity of scientism). 
Walsh insists that the Gospel’s importance for Locke is that it ap-
prehends for us:
“the rule of morality as law, carrying the full force of obliga-
tion because it derives from the divine lawgiver. . . . Only if we 
understand morality in this sense as law do we see it clearly 
as an authoritative order, independent of our estimations of it 
because it derives from a source absolutely capable of impos-
ing rewards and punishments on us.”11
Has Locke lost something in characterizing the Gospel as “law” 
and Christ as lawgiver instead of as person?12 “Law” as an enduring 
order is a cosmological symbolism that approximates that which is 
10 GLS 157, quoting Reasonableness of Christianity, ed. George W. Ewing 
(Washington: Regnery, 1965), pars. 22, 167, & 181.
11 GLS 157, citing Reasonableness of Christianity, par. 243.
12 On the importance of the distinction between law and person, see Rémi 
Brague, The Law of God: The Philosophical History of an Idea, trans. Lydia 
G. Cochrane (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007). For elaboration, 
see my “God’s Co-workers: Rémi Brague’s Treatment of the Divine Law in 
Christianity” Political Science Reviewer XXXVIII (2009): 76–104.
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differentiated beyond the cosmos, but cannot be identifi ed with it. 
One senses with Locke’s “law” talk, especially with his insistence on 
the guarantee of rewards and punishments, the language of natu-
ral causes creeping back into his moral thinking. One still senses a 
Newtonian overlay that regards reality in terms of effective causes 
in Locke’s treatment of the moral law.13 The evidence Walsh draws 
from Locke’s private journals undermines the perception that 
Locke was a crypto-deist or Enlightenment rationalist. However, 
his language of effi cient causes (as opposed to, say, the language of 
analogia entis) suggests an effort to describe transcendent reality in 
terms ill-suited for it.
Moreover, effi cient causes are about effi ciency. For Locke, the 
Gospel provides a morality that works in the sense that it rewards 
and punishes, just as he insists political power has the right of 
“making Laws with Penalties of Death, and consequently all less 
Penalties.”14 The advantage of political power is that it is natural law 
made effective. Locke is less interested than Aquinas, for example, 
who omits coercion from his defi nition of law, in treating human 
law as a determination of the natural law and thus as an emblem of 
human rationality.
Locke’s tendency to analyze morality, politics, and religion in 
terms of effi cient causes and law is at odds with the mystical ele-
ment Walsh detects. In Locke, the priority of the practical takes the 
form of articulating a morality that above all must work. This is the 
truth in Strauss’s interpretation that the early moderns lowered the 
goal of politics, as the good and the noble is not always socially and 
politically effective. Locke’s desire for an effective law includes a 
divine law that fi rst and foremost ensures the just get rewarded and 
the wicked punished. While medieval political thinkers theorized 
about human law as an analogue of the divine and eternal law, they 
still confronted the mystery of God’s mercy in meting out justice. 
If the liberal order is to be pragmatic, then its foundations had bet-
ter work. As we shall see below with Kant, the moral language of 
law has a higher purpose than to reduce the moral life to effi cient 
13 As described by Voegelin, History of Political Ideas, 164–6, 172–9. 
14 Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988), 268.
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causes, but there too one can see vestiges of scientism in Kant’s 
moral language. Moreover, the language of law obscures the ground 
of morality even as it reveals our duty.
If the turn to existence in the liberal order produces its own 
distortion in the form of scientism, the other distortion it produces 
is in the form of “progress,” which is seen most clearly in J. S. Mill. 
The two distortions are of a single piece because both, in locating 
the work of reason essentially in the world (i.e., the subject-object 
dichotomy), defl ect it from the subject and thus corrode the indi-
vidual’s sense of responsibility in moral struggle. If the liberal order 
can rely on science to secure order out of disorder, then the indi-
vidual lacks incentive to turn within and ascend from disorder: “If 
the process of maturation and self-responsibility is part of the auto-
nomic movement of history, then there is no necessity to undertake 
the arduous effort to inculcate and practice the virtues themselves. 
We can simply wait for history itself to perform the task” (GLS 86). 
Faith in progress has been the main expression of “an opening to-
ward the fulfi llment inchoately present within” (GLS 6) the liberal 
order, and if this faith is shattered, then “the shock of the collision 
of reality all the more traumatic. Liberals are typically astonished 
to discover that the generation that has grown up under its less 
demanding tutelage is less responsible and caring than any prior 
generation” (GLS 86).
Mill appealed to a secularized version of kenotic love in the 
form of each generation serving as a benefactor to the next. His lib-
eral faith was grounded in his faith in progress. Walsh fi nds him an 
especially fascinating fi gure because his humanitarian love grasps 
at the essence of Christianity but, by relying on his secularized faith 
in progress, he “cannot explain the relationship between self-ac-
tualization and universal love. It stands as a bare postulate” (GLS 
146). Mill has a “religious rejection of religion” (GLS 187). Mill’s 
defense of liberty leads him to prefer Manichaeism to Christianity 
because he cannot bear a God willing to permit the existence of 
evil. His adherence to the pure moral law prevents him from be-
ing Christian. Walsh provides a lengthy quotation of the conclusion 
of “The Utility of Religion,” where Mill contemplates the possibil-
ity of heroic service of the greater good without the possibility of 
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rewards or consolations (GLS 187). Walsh fi nds this passage sig-
nifi cant because it constitutes an equivalent to Aristotle’s notion of 
philosophizing as the act of immortalizing: “[Mill] does not need to 
contemplate an immortality of endless days because he has already 
glimpsed the reality of immortality” (GLS 187).
Yet, Mill lacks a “sense of reassuring contact with the redemp-
tive divine presence, the mystery of the divine suffering of evil that 
renders the human suffering of evil bearable,” which means he can-
not await reconciliation. He must be a self-assured co-creator with 
God, if there is one, who works toward the ultimate “complete tri-
umph of good over evil which history points to.”15 Mill is emblem-
atic of liberals whose faith in historical progress gives them a sense 
of sustenance, but whose sustenance is shallow and undermines 
their responsibility in moral struggle. In the twentieth century, 
John Rawls would echo Mill’s appeal to progress in his own appeal 
to evolution as a cosmic guarantee that society would induce people 
to act with a pure heart and a sense of justice: “The temptation to 
extrapolate from the fragile island of order, imagining that it will be 
extended infi nitely into the vast sea of disorder that surrounds it, is 
virtually irresistible to some of the leading liberal thinkers” (GLS 
85). A faith that an individual experience of order will translate into 
cosmic order is what Voegelin called “metastatic faith,” and it seems 
to be built into the dominant strain of the liberal tradition’s priority 
of the practical over the theoretical. Liberal thinkers expected the 
blessings of liberty to be so obvious that it would draw others into 
its wake (GLS 316). But that has not happened because liberalism 
itself has a crisis in faith, which is related to the priority of the prac-
tical. The practical is predicated on success, and the dark night of 
the soul required by moral struggle defi es this expectation. This is 
the lesson liberal empire-builders in Mill’s time and in ours seem 
to forget.
Despite the ordering of the trilogy, The Growth of the Liberal 
Soul thus ends where After Ideology begins, though at a deeper 
level, which is with the uncertain status of the goal of our moral 
struggle in the modern world. However, now it is uncertain whether 
15 J. S. Mill, “Utility of Religion,” Three Essays on Religion (Amherst, NY: 
Prometheus Books, 1988), 117.
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it is even appropriate to speak of the “goal” of moral struggle: “Is 
it possible to authoritatively communicate the great purpose of hu-
man freedom without prejudicing that freedom itself?” (GLS 316). 
The Growth of the Liberal Soul ends with one wondering whether, 
despite the resilience of the liberal order, it fi nally needs some re-
course to classical Christianity to ground itself because it is not 
entirely clear what deepening the priority of the practical in the 
modern context would look like.
An Interlude to Change Modes
Walsh published two pivotal books, with implications for the direc-
tion of the trilogy, between The Growth of the Liberal Soul (1997) 
and The Modern Philosophical Revolution (2008): The Third Mil-
lennium: Refl ections on Faith and Reason (1999) and Guarded By 
Mystery: Meaning in a Postmodern Age (2000). Along with his in-
troduction to the volume of Eric Voegelin’s Anamnesis he edited for 
the Collected Works project, Walsh changed his mode of scholar-
ship. Instead of writing about philosophy, these works gave Walsh 
the opportunity to explore how to write in a meditative mode as an 
exercise in philosophy.
In Anamnesis, we fi nd in Voegelin a model of a thinker adopt-
ing a more meditative mode of writing. As indicated above in the 
introduction, Anamnesis is less a report on philosophy than a philo-
sophical exercise participating in the unfolding of the very luminous 
experiences it explores (A 9, 27). Walsh found that Voegelin’s essays 
on Aristotle (“What is Nature?” and “What is Right By Nature?”) 
stand out as efforts to move beyond the subject-object dichotomy 
of philosophy. These essays are paradoxical because, though about 
Aristotle, they partake of the modern philosophical revolution.16 
16 According to Walsh, Voegelin’s existential turn shows he participated in 
the modern philosophical revolution, but did not suffi ciently appreciate the 
extent to which it is modern, as his analysis of modern thinkers focused on 
their deformations (EV 14–17). Walsh’s effort can be seen as a continuation 
of Voegelin’s meditation while applying it to the modern world more thor-
oughly. This being the case, the role that Voegelin’s critique of modernity in 
bringing the modern philosophical revolution into focus deserves attention 
as well. In Growth of the Liberal Soul, Walsh had conceded that efforts to 
retrieve premodern traditions are crucial in recollecting “the depth from 
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“Natural right” is found inadequate because it neglects the revela-
tion of being that is the source of nature (see MPR 12). In these es-
says, Voegelin refi gures the question of physei dikaion as the soul’s 
participation in its quest for order. His effort represents not a de-
parture, but a deepening of Aristotle. Voegelin’s later meditations 
explore the “intentionality-luminosity tensions” in the “continuities 
between the ancient and modern world” (A 22), and despite Walsh’s 
disagreement with Voegelin over the nature of modernity in fi gures 
like Hegel and Nietzsche, Walsh’s subsequent work in The Modern 
Philosophical Revolution constitutes a continuation of Voegelin’s 
exploration of “continuities.”
An example from Voegelin illustrates this continuity. In his last 
essay, “Quod Deus Dicitur,” Voegelin himself treats as a trajectory, 
Aquinas’s “proof” of the existence of God, Leibniz’s “principle of 
suffi cient reason,” Descartes’ cogito, Hegel’s exploration of thought’s 
movement, and Anselm’s Proslogion.17 This essay is characteristic of 
Voegelin’s frequent return to the same thinkers and even texts to 
reconsider, refi gure, and reinterpret experience. Aquinas’s “proof” 
is insuffi cient because his categories of causes based on a subject-
object dichotomy overshadows the divine-human encounter that 
characterizes the quest for God. A deepened sense of the quest-like 
character is seen in the other thinkers, which is seen in its greatest 
clarity with Anselm’s noetic prayer. Voegelin treats “ancient” and 
“modern” as, at best, secondary categories. Thus, the task for phi-
which the modern world springs and on which its liberal self-expression 
still depends. Without such a work of recovery, there would be no chance 
that the liberal political order could be rendered coherent; it would be 
condemned to wander forever in the half-light of its intuitive twilight that 
never dawns into the full luminosity of articulate transparence” (GLS 259). 
While Walsh in the Modern Philosophical Revolution would not state this 
so starkly, and in fact seems to argue against this, the modern philosophical 
revolution cannot be understood as such without understanding the “exis-
tential” turn in Plato, Aristotle, and Augustine that enables modern thinkers 
to work through the implications of their existential turn (all of whom play 
pivotal roles for the thinkers Walsh discusses in the Modern Philosophical 
Revolution). 
17 Voegelin, “Quod Deus Dicitur,” Published Essays, 1966–1985, Collected 
Works, Vol. 12, ed. Ellis Sandoz, 376–94.
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losophy now is to recapture man’s discovery of his existence as il-
luminated from within by Intellect or Nous, and not by Aristotelian 
etiology.18 With Voegelin’s achievements, Walsh suggests, “perhaps 
it is not too sanguine to expect that we may be on the verge of a 
new beginning in the modern world when philosophy and revela-
tion could come together to again shelter the life of reason within 
time. This would surely be a continuation of the great path of anam-
nesis” (A 10). Walsh’s suggestion could stand as a epigraph for the 
fi nal volume of his trilogy.
Before turning to the fi nal volume, notice should be paid to 
the meditative character of Guarded By Mystery, which extends 
his analysis of liberty made in The Growth of the Liberal Soul, but 
resides now within a meditation from within liberty that has been 
made possible by the kinds of Aristotelian insights made in Anam-
nesis. Walsh guides the reader through a meditation on the ethical 
life, and does so in the conversational mode. In this book, Walsh 
deepens his refl ections on the priority of the practical, and the in-
ner, mysterious vitality of that priority as we experience it when 
we disclose truth in the very act of living the ethical life (G 7–11, 
49–97). In After Ideology, he notes that the most diffi cult task in 
articulating morality is conveying “the sense of ultimate rightness 
that underpins it” (AI 194). In The Growth of the Liberal Soul, we 
saw how liberal thinkers participated in that ultimate rightness but 
in a mode of misplaced concreteness (i.e., identifying the source of 
liberal faith in terms of progress).
In Guarded by Mystery, Dostoevsky’s pathos and Mill’s hubris 
get replaced with a common sense and indeed humble reminder 
of our participation in the moral life. His meditation on liberty in-
cludes a forceful reminder that our experience of liberty contains 
an awareness of what is not free, and thus liberty has its own limits 
or logic in its unfolding in the moral life. We are invited to “be not 
afraid!” and to return to ourself in the goal of our longing, “ever old 
and ever new, as Saint Augustine described it” (G 77). All human be-
ings recognize themselves in the unfolding of the moral life Walsh 
describes. Most will also recognize that “now it emerges within us 
as the most real reality there is, as the true measure, loss of which 
18 See also Voegelin, “On Debate and Existence,” ibid., 36–48.
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would be loss of all that makes life meaningful. At stake is noth-
ing less than reality itself. By responding to the pull of the moral 
reality that draws us, its presence is manifested more completely in 
our lives. The miracle of illumination occurs” (G 56). Faith sustains 
the moral life in its darkest moments, but in recognizing the dark-
ness as darkness, we recognize what transcends it: “Now for a brief 
magical moment all that looking toward an unlimited horizon is 
rewarded. The mystery that seemed to guard its own secret so well 
inexplicably comes into partial focus. We see through the depths of 
divine being it contains. That is the outburst of revelation” (G 77). 
Guarded By Mystery is a meditation on the mysterious horizon of 
being in which we live out our moral lives. It recollects the moral 
life within that horizon. With The Modern Philosophical Revolu-
tion, Walsh explicates the paradox of that horizon and our turn to 
existence towards it.
The Luminosity of Existence
If Guarded By Mystery is a meditation on the moral life that en-
gages the reader in the moral life, The Modern Philosophical Revo-
lution explores the horizon of the moral life and the experience 
of the horizon as such. For this reason, the book’s subtitle, The 
Luminosity of Existence, was the originally intended title. As inti-
mated already in Guarded By Mystery, the Modern Philosophical 
Revolution shows a modernity not characterized by secular reason, 
but a re-cognition of faith, and indeed kenotic love, that arises out 
of a deepening of the meaning of reason. The breathtaking scope 
and impetuosity of Walsh’s thesis, no less than a reinterpretation of 
a philosophical movement including Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, Hei-
degger, Derrida, Levinas, and Kierkegaard, prevents an adequate 
summary of the argument’s constituent parts. Instead, we will seek 
the argument in outline form by considering Walsh’s treatment of 
the bookends of the modern philosophical revolution: Kant, the 
fi rst thinker covered because he makes the turn to existence, and 
Kierkegaard, the last thinker covered not because he comes last in 
time but as a marginal fi gure barely understood even now, he re-
fl ected most deeply on the turn to existence.
Stated somewhat simplistically, the modern philosophical revo-
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lution is a turn to the activity of reason and the turn toward the 
other as our partner in living the moral law. These two moments 
constitute the same turn. The luminosity of existence reveals our 
other-regarding nature. The priority of the practical over the theo-
retical means the priority of the moral over the metaphysical, and 
implies human beings are beings toward the other.19 It begins with 
Kant’s discovery of the priority of practical reason over theoreti-
cal reason, argued most thoroughly in the Critique of Judgment 
and the Metaphysics of Morals, and fi nds its deepest insight in Ki-
erkegaard’s unique insistence on the nature of morality revealed in 
action and in love as the horizon of existence. Existence becomes 
luminous when we are most fully aware of the mystery that guards 
us, and this can be seen with increased intensity of the thinkers 
Walsh treats, as they come to grips with the understanding that the 
human can be given but it cannot be contained by the means by 
which it is conveyed.
Kant plays a central role in Walsh’s trilogy. Kant’s devotion to 
the moral law is central to Walsh’s treatment of the liberal order 
(e.g., GLS 212–9). However, Kant’s full signifi cance is seen in his 
recovery of teleology (within freedom) in the modern world in the 
Critique of Judgment. Kant’s explanation provides the context, in 
retrospect, for Walsh’s argument about moral action in Guarded By 
Mystery, and, because it still contains Kant’s critique of Aristotelian 
etiology, extends the deepening of reason initiated by Voegelin seen 
in the essays cited above. While the previous volumes showed that 
practice reveals purpose, Kant now shows us why:
Once it had been admitted that we have no access to ends 
other than our own enactment of purposes, there was little 
point fretting, as Kant appeared to do, over our inability to 
fi nd empirical confi rmation for fi nality. We must simply admit 
that ends can be known only from within their pursuit and 
accept that, if we wish to apply the notion of fi nality to the 
working of nature, we have no option other than to extend the 
structure of purpose we already know through our own prac-
19 It should already be evident that Walsh’s treatment of otherness is not 
reducible to an “I-Thou” relationship of subjectivities.
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tice of it. Kant’s great contribution was to demonstrate that it 
is only on that basis that we can make nature intelligible. He 
took the crucial step of relieving us of the burden of fi nding 
empirical proof for the process of empirical proof by showing 
us the impossibility of the task. If we could provide empirical 
verifi cation, that would in turn stand in need of the same veri-
fi cation. Kant’s signifi cance in the history of thought is that 
he laid bare the conditions for the possibility of knowledge 
in ways that have not been surpassed, although he did not 
lay to rest the deeper questions of reliability that can never 
ultimately be answered by knowledge itself. Without actually 
admitting it, Kant disclosed the extent to which reason rests 
on faith (MPR 34–5).
Reason fi nds itself in the reality it judges and seeks to under-
stand. Practical reason is prior to theoretical reason because theo-
retical reason cannot understand its own limits while practical rea-
son can see its limits in the mystery of existence: “we cannot serve 
any good other than the good that is disclosed in our movement 
toward it” (MPR 73). Even so, both theoretical and practical rea-
son frequently “formulate . . . the limits of thinking in terms of an 
antinomy of judgment” because reason becomes self-aware of its 
own limit. Thus, Walsh’s analysis frequently takes the form of an 
antinomy in order to recollect that the deepening of reason can only 
come through itself, and the necessity that reason fi nds its roots in 
faith.20
20 The following examples suffi ce: “Only reason can grapple with the self-
imposed limitation of reason” (MPR 2); “Technology, which treats every-
thing as a means and nothing as an end, cannot furnish its own purpose” 
(MPR 2); “Mastery cannot master itself” (MPR 3); “If science holds a 
monopoly on truth, how do we validate the truth of this monopoly?” (MPR 
7); “Reason cannot annihilate itself, because it has never really possessed 
itself” (MPR 15); “Writing . . . cannot be concluded and it is this impos-
sibility that provides the possibility of writing” (MPR 25); “Contrary to 
the Hegelian suggestion that the necessity might be grasped and thereby 
overcome, Kierkegaard understood that the necessity was precisely the 
nongraspability of necessity” (MPR 26); “Being cannot become present to us 
because, if it did, we would no longer be able to exist in relation to it. It is by 
DAVID WALSH’S ANAMNESIS OF MODERNITY 159
In turning to morality, fi nding the outer limits of practical rea-
son, whether in the form of the postulates of God, immortality, or 
freedom, or in the laws that express the “boundaries of right” in 
moral action (MPR 66), entails both articulating the formal struc-
ture of moral action in the self-limiting logic of autonomy, as well 
as its motivation. As noted above, Walsh accepts Kant’s claim that 
Aristotelian eudaimonianism is always prone to becoming self-in-
terested action.21 Perhaps, but acting out of duty, where “our ac-
tion partakes of the divine freedom of action as moved by nothing 
beyond itself” (MPR 41) contains its own Pelagian seeds as we saw 
with J. S. Mill. Kierkegaard, as we shall see, will have to correct 
Kant on the meaning of freedom.
Walsh views the Metaphysics of Morals as “a model of what 
metaphysics must be when it becomes existential” (MPR 60). The 
“Doctrine of Virtue” with its emphasis on the motivations for vir-
tue follows the formalistic “Doctrine of Right,” which lays out the 
conditions for ethical action. Here Kant answers the charge of Pela-
gianism by explaining how “responsibility is thrust upon us in ways 
that not only rob us of the leisure of contemplation but compel us 
to confront depths of existence we had scarcely even suspected” 
(MPR 61). For this reason, politics is at the heart of philosophy be-
cause it is given to us; it forces us to make choices. In other words, 
even asking for the motivation for moral action, whether out of duty, 
inclination, caritas, eros, or eudaimonianism, derives from the mo-
tivation it seeks. Thus the “circularity” of Kant’s meditation (MPR 
69).
Kant’s treatment of friendship at the conclusion of the “Doc-
trine of Virtue” exhibits the starkness of existential choice and 
shows why he “requires us to wrestle with the confl icts generated by 
its own application” (MPR 66). The formalistic Kant, who outlines 
the mercy of being in its absence that we exist” (MPR 26).
21 Aristotle is always on the verge of losing the insight that virtue is its own 
reward (MPR 70). Kant expresses this idea with a pun: “if eudaimonism (the 
principle of happiness) is set up as the basic principle [or morality] instead 
of eleutheronomy (the principle of the freedom of internal lawgiving), the 
result is the euthanasia (easy death) of all morals” (“Metaphysics of Morals,” 
511).
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right, says, as he does in his “Lectures on Ethics,” that friendship 
develops the “minor virtues” of life because it is simply partial and 
preferential. However, Kant of the Metaphysics of Morals places 
friendship at the conclusion of the “Doctrine of Virtue” as an em-
blem to its being paramount in our obligations to others. One sus-
pects he is now closer to Aristotle, whose two books on friendship 
(compared to one on justice) constitute the penultimate books of 
the Nicomachean Ethics.
Friendship is the “union of two persons through mutual love 
and respect. . . . For love can be regarded as attraction and respect 
as repulsion, and if the principle of love bids friends to draw closer, 
the principle of respect requires them to stay at a proper distance 
from each other.”22 One might wonder why Kant uses Newtonian 
categories to describe moral phenomenon.23 Laying aside the ques-
tion of whether this is an adequate way of considering friendship 
“in its perfection,”24 Kant here characterizes the epitome of virtue 
as standing on the knife-edge (not mean) of two extremes. Love 
as attraction, without the leavening of respect, becomes narcissis-
tic intimacy where friends reveal things about their “natural state,” 
which is a loathsome outrage to humanity.25 Taken to its extreme 
(or perfection), love as attraction leads to its opposite, to conquest, 
destruction, consumption, rape, or obliteration. Perfect attraction 
obliterates individual identity. In the romantic Kant recognizes 
love’s ideal of perfect absorption of selves, as Plato has Aristophanes 
describe it in the Symposium.26 For its part, respect, as repulsion, 
22 “Metaphysics of Morals,” 584–85.
23 See Marcia Baron, “Love and Respect in Doctrine of Virtue,” in Kant’s 
Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretive Essays, ed. Mark Timmons, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), 392.
24 Aristotle describes sunaisthesis as the peak of his friendship teaching. 
Love as attraction and respect as repulsion are beside the point because at 
the stage of moral development where sunaisthesis is practiced, each self re-
gards himself and the other as a unique individual revelation of the good as 
they both partake of the good in partnership (see my “‘Sunaisthetic’ Friend-
ship and the Foundations of Political Anthropology,” International Political 
Anthropology I:2 [November 2008]: 179–93).
25 “Lecture on Ethics” in Other Selves: Philosophers on Friendship, ed. 
Michael Pakaluk (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1991), 215.
26 Kierkegaard has his romantic seducer recognize this Aristophanic (as 
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would fi nd its perfection in the utter inability to share a common 
world, enmity. So friendship considered in its perfection means 
prudentially negotiating the knife-edge between conquest and en-
mity, which amount to the same thing. Or, the attempt to balance 
attraction and respect (as repulsion) might actually suggest the ex-
ample of a pair of lovers where one of them has betrayed the other: 
the betrayal severs their love, but attraction remains.27
If this existential choice seems stark, it is helpful to recall that 
as Kant argues in Religion Within the Limits of Religion, “partak-
ing of both time and eternity, we act always as if we implicate the 
whole of our existence in each moment and reach beyond ourselves 
into the divine relationship of all creation” (MPR 60). Walsh’s Kant, 
the paradigmatic Enlightenment philosopher who supposedly ar-
ticulates the unity of knowledge, is closer to Kierkegaard, the fi rst 
great critic of the Enlightenment’s ideal of the unity of knowledge 
and purported proponent of radical choice, than many think. Walsh 
demonstrates that the picture of Kant as proponent of secular rea-
son and Kierkegaard as existentialist is simplistic when seen in light 
of the priority of practical reason.
Because we cannot determine ahead of time where the knife-
edge will be, Walsh interprets Kant as a theorist of practical reason, 
who deepens Aristotle’s view of practical reason: “interpretation of 
principles is established through an internal meditation” (MPR 66). 
As seen in the example of friendship, the principles of love and re-
spect require balancing, which is a sign of our freedom; their ap-
plication requires practical wisdom. While the “Doctrine of Virtue” 
is less formalistic than the “Doctrine of Right” or other refl ections 
on right in Kant’s writings, it still has a “formalistic style” for which 
Walsh frequently needs to apologize because such formalism hides 
attributed by Plato) ideal as well (Either/Or: Part I, ed. Howard V. Hong and 
Edna H. Hong [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987], 443–4).
27 “She had never known any torment like this. This mixture of intimacy 
and inaccessibility, of repulsion and attraction, of hopeless loss and hope 
that all might yet be regained—this confused sensation seemed to become a 
crimson glow in the darkness, its incandescent rays fi lling the room scorch-
ing her breast, drawing from her. . . . one long wail!” (Alexandr Solzhenitsyn, 
November 1916, trans. H. T. Willetts (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 
1999), 695). 
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the existential imperative (e.g., MPR 62–63, 66). Of course, it is this 
very formalism that has led interpreters to regard him as, indeed, 
formalistic on account of his application of the scientifi c method to 
ethics. Moreover, Kant was “enthralled” with the success of modern 
science because its method organized phenomena within patterns 
generated by understanding (MPR 51). Walsh demonstrates that 
Kant’s understanding of practical reason moves beyond scientifi c 
reason. However, one wonders whether Kant, like Locke before 
him, was overly enthralled by the concept of “law” in the fi rst place 
and whether his formalistic style prevented him from pushing his 
existential turn deeper.
Kant’s formalistic style serves his view that ethical reasoning 
takes the form of legislation. Walsh argues law has three advan-
tages. First, the idea of law implies the equality of every human 
being under it (MPR 68). Our submission to law is also our submis-
sion to the dignity of all human beings. Second, law obliges us to 
choose an action for its own sake, and by doing so elevates choice 
as the pivotal moment in moral life. Walsh argues this represents a 
differentiation within the classical and Christian understanding of 
law (MPR 47).
Third, laws reveal the boundaries of right more adequately 
than do examples: “For all examples (which only illustrate but can-
not prove anything) are treacherous, so that they certainly require 
a metaphysics.”28 Just as the example of Jesus Christ was predicated 
on the idea of Christ within human beings (MPR 56), so too does 
our knowledge of examples presuppose the rule to which they point. 
Kant underestimates the nature and power of the moral example. 
For his part, Aristotle regarded particular examples (e.g., the actions 
of Achilles) as containing the universal.29 They play an important 
role in moral education not only for showing the principle in action, 
28 MPR 66, quoting Metaphysics of Morals, 355.
29 “An example (epagoge) is in fact a source of something universal, while 
deductive reasoning is from things that are universal. Therefore there are 
sources from which deductive reasoning proceeds, of which there is no 
deduction, and therefore what makes them known are examples.” (Nicoma-
chean Ethics, trans. Joe Sachs [Newburyport, MA: Focus Publishing, 2002], 
1139b39–40). See also Heyking, “‘Sunaisthetic’ Friendship and the Founda-
tions of Political Anthropology,” 185.
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but also in showing them in application, which is the Achilles heel of 
Kant’s formalism, as laws do not tell us how they should be applied. 
Moreover, as Aristotle notes, examples are, in a mysterious sense, 
the fi rst principles of moral action insofar as they represent a society 
to itself and are therefore the pregiven principles and practices of 
that society, which is why Aristotle, unlike Kant, does not face the 
problem of having to fi nd reasons for obeying the moral law. Indeed, 
Walsh helpfully illuminates the importance of examples in terms of 
myths in his discussion of Kant’s Religion Within the Limits of Rea-
son when explaining myth’s utility in explaining original sin: “Myth 
extrapolates the boundaries of experience. It does not explain, but 
marks the limits of explanation. Yet myth, as Kant demonstrates, is 
indispensable for fully articulating the parameters of the moral life, 
which must confront the diffi culty of eradicating evil that is the in-
explicable failure of goodness” (MPR 55). If practical reason opens 
toward supersensible reality that bursts the bounds of immanence 
(MPR 53) and shows us our actions originate in time but partake of 
unconditioned eternity (MPR 58), then myth is well-suited to ex-
press that boundary, as it always has done.
It is this consideration of myth’s ambivalent philosophical status 
that leads us to the end of Walsh’s modern trajectory, Kierkegaard. 
Kant’s formalism serves his universalism, but Kierkegaard’s use of 
“dramatic” or mythological pseudonyms is a way of conveying the 
incommunicability of the particular individual, the human per-
son, who stands, fi nally, above the universal (MPR 419). It is also 
a means of showing love as the horizon of existence because the 
pseudonyms, along with the writings in Kierkegaard’s own name, 
reveal the limits of authorship. In an existential mode, which is also 
the mode whereby love is revealed as the boundary of existence, the 
author is forced to realize that all he can do is evoke experience in 
another, in the reader.30
30 In considering Kierkegaard living philosophically and thereby gaining 
distance from his authorship, The Modern Philosophical Revolution returns 
to the beginning of the trilogy, After Ideology. For example, “Dostoevsky 
was to develop the polyphonic novel as the means by which the author’s 
point of view could be withdrawn to allow the characters to speak for them-
selves. Only the truth that emerged indirectly from the test of ‘living life’ 
THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER164
As Kierkegaard observes in Works of Love, we cannot implant 
love in another but must presume love is already in the other. This 
requires a doubling back on the lover/author, who must be prepared 
for his own transformation in love. Thus, as a lover loves his neigh-
bor and thereby risks his own transformation and self-sacrifi ce, so 
too does the author write in anticipation of being rewritten by the 
reader. This is why Kierkegaard refers to this and other works as 
an “upbuilding discourse” and not “discourses for upbuilding” be-
cause the author himself is being upbuilt (MPR 415, citing Eighteen 
Upbuilding Discourses). In Walsh’s terms, the author is written by 
the text.31 Kierkegaard’s meditations on the aesthetic, ethical, and 
religious, point to the paradox of faith that reveals the singularity of 
the individual but, paradoxically or because of this singularity, the 
individual cannot be contained in the means by which it is com-
municated. Kierkegaard deepens Kant’s practical turn by showing 
how the boundaries of action are revealed by action itself, not by 
a priori rules, and by deepening the meditative “circularity” that 
Kant inaugurates.32
Kierkegaard continues Kant’s turn to existence, but he advances 
it because in following through on the transfi guration of duty from 
law to love, morality is fi nally shorn of the vestiges of Newtonian 
language of effi cient causes, which we saw in Kant’s reference to 
attraction and repulsion in his discussion of friendship. Indeed, this 
is the key reason Walsh places Kierkegaard as the high point of 
modernity. He does not relapse into scientism or into intramundane 
apocalypse, as do each of the other thinkers—in various ways—
Walsh covers in The Modern Philosophical Revolution. If we think 
of scientism as the imposition of the concepts of effi cient causes into 
moral language, then Kierkegaard plumbs the depths of scientism 
to bring the kenotic source of reason into focus. He does this not by 
criticizing scientism per se, but in his critique of modern despair, 
could express an authoritative utterance” (MPR 399).
31 For this reason, Walsh insists Kierkegaard anticipates and thinks beyond 
Jacques Derrida’s paradoxical thinking on writing.
32 I have elsewhere examined the signifi cance of Kierkegaard in the light of 
friendship, “Friendship in Light of the Modern Philosophical Revolution,” 
Fideles: A Journal of Redeemer Pacifi c College, Vol. 4 (2009): 37–76.
DAVID WALSH’S ANAMNESIS OF MODERNITY 165
which is the result of scientism.
This is seen clearly in Either/Or.33 The aesthete, whom Judge 
William calls upon to establish his moral personality by making 
a choice, is the epitome of modern restlessness, which Walsh de-
scribes as a “peculiar mood of enervation when the abundance of 
possibilities robs all possibility from human existence” (411n.14).34 
The aesthete exemplifi es modern man whom modern science has 
informed that he lives in a cosmos characterized by infi nite space 
and therefore possesses infi nite possibilities for his action. He ex-
emplifi es the Copernican revolution, of which Michael Polanyi asks 
why Copernicus would exchange his “actual terrestrial station for 
an imaginary solar standpoint.”35 The imagined possibility of infi -
nite possibilities for a concrete mortal man undermines his capacity 
for choice and thus his moral agency, because he fi nds no single 
possibility or choice ultimately matters.
Judge William tries to provoke his friend, the aesthete, into 
making a choice. Judge William further explains how marriage is 
the paradigmatic human relationship because in it husband and wife 
give themselves to one another. Continuing Kant’s insight regard-
ing the revelation of telos in the unfolding of action, Judge William 
recognizes his argument for the superiority of marriage can only be 
understood from within it.36 This also leads Judge William to recog-
nize that he cannot be friends with the aesthete because the latter 
is not a moral agent. The ultimacy of choice in love leads Walsh to 
argue for a deepening of the existential turn in Kierkegaard from 
Kant, for whom ethical action has its origin in eternity: “Now Wil-
liam explains, ‘I turn everything around and say: The esthetic is 
33 It is also seen in Kierkegaard’s discussion of doubt in modern philoso-
phy (Johannes Climacus, or De omnibus dubitandum est, in Philosophical 
Fragments/Johannes Climacus, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 113–73).
34 Walsh compares enervation of the esthete to Tocqueville’s observation of 
the melancholy that derives from of democratic selves being so restless and 
to Leo Strauss’s observation that Lockean man is on a “joyless quest for joy” 
(MPR 412).
35 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1962), 3.
36 Either/Or, II: 98.
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not in the immediate but in the acquired; but marriage is precisely 
that immediacy which contains mediacy, that infi nity which con-
tains fi nitude, that eternity which contains temporality” (409, citing 
Either/Or II, 94). Mutual giving of selves is an eschatological event 
(MPR 410). In choosing, “the I chooses itself or, more correctly, 
receives itself.”37 Kierkegaard’s great achievement for modern phi-
losophy is to realize that in the choice that constitutes one as moral 
agent, one receives himself and therefore the other, the neighbor.
In Works of Love, Kierkegaard refl ects upon the command that 
we should love our neighbor. His meditation on love is also a medi-
tation on duty: “The performance of duty for duty’s sake that had so 
occupied Kant has now been reached in the love that fulfi ls the law 
because it is free, loving only out of love” (MPR 452). Works of Love 
builds up the reader to recognize love as the horizon of existence. 
There is no standard beyond it. Because it is written in the existen-
tial mode, there is no need to analyze it from within the world of 
objects (which he thinks plagues eros and friendship). More clearly 
than Judge William, Kierkegaard in Works of Love meditates on 
love as the horizon of existence, which marks the outer terminus 
for Kant’s discovery that teleology is revealed from within ethical 
action. While Works of Love is a meditation on the actions of Jesus 
Christ (who is Love), its perspective is through and through that of 
the ethical agent whose understanding of the good is revealed in his 
moral action. Kierkegaard articulates freedom shorn from scientism 
and thus from the Pelagianism that frequently seems to mark Kant 
and the “bad” modernity that plagues all the other thinkers exam-
ined in Walsh’s fi nal volume.
Thus Kierkegaard stands at the outer limit of the modern turn 
to existence because he most clearly (and paradoxically) articulates 
kenotic love as the horizon of our existence. If Kant deepens Coper-
nicus’s revolution, which lost man in the cosmos, then Kierkegaard’s 
account of love deepens the insight made by thinkers across the 
ages, including Augustine, Thomas More, and Nicolaus Cusanus, 
that all places are equidistant from God, both infi nitely far and infi -
nitely near. As the terminus of the modern philosophical revolution 
(at least for now), Kierkegaard confi rms Walsh’s observation that 
37 Either/Or, II: 177.
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modern philosophy has not eliminated the need for faith, “but that 
philosophy has come to understand the meaning of faith in a very 
different way” (MPR, xiv).
Conclusion
Walsh’s achievement in his trilogy is that he has recovered reality 
in the key of modern philosophy. Modernity, usually characterized 
as seeing reason as ultimate, has reasoned its way to understand the 
limits of reason. Behind reason is the love that grounds it. This is 
the insight that informs the ascent from the depths in After Ideol-
ogy and grounds the sustaining faith in the liberal order in Growth 
of the Liberal Soul. By now it should be evident that Walsh provides 
more than a Christian moral theology that would seek to “tame” the 
radical modern philosophers. As his discussion of Nietzsche and, 
indeed, Kierkegaard indicates, part of the coming “to understand 
the meaning of faith in a very different way” is to reject Christianity 
and its message of kenotic love. For Walsh, this is implicit in kenotic 
love. It would be up to the critics of Walsh (and of Kierkegaard, 
for example) to demonstrate that their criticisms are borne from 
a perspective outside of kenotic love. Yet, as Walsh has shown of 
the most formidable of modern philosophers, their thinking moves 
within this horizon. For example, the constant “deconstruction” of 
the postmoderns is necessarily motivated by a desire for genuine 
contact with reality.
The more daunting problem that vexes the trilogy is the dis-
tance between the philosophers and liberal societies. Kant and Ki-
erkegaard’s insight that teleology is revealed only from within the 
moral practice may be true, but politics must frequently appeal to 
transcendent meaning in order to secure the necessary corrections 
within its practices. For example, Supreme Court judges frequently 
need to defi ne fundamental principles, including freedom and dig-
nity, in order to preserve them. While science and human rights 
are two of the three pillars of modernity, the ways they have been 
expressed (or asserted) have been problematic and refl ect the famil-
iar examples of “bad” modernity (e.g., scientism and progress). How 
the truth of existence can be made socially and politically effective 
is a conundrum. In disclosing the unexamined faith of our lives in 
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the realm of action, the problem of civil religion not only arises but 
reveals itself as an enduring fi xture of political life, including in the 
liberal order where the faith that sustains that order always has dif-
fi culty fi nding public affi rmation.38
Walsh’s Growth of the Liberal Soul already answers much of 
this concern. The threats to human dignity can be corrected only 
on the grounds of human dignity. In addressing the challenge of el-
evating dignity as a public good, I have the following to add. Canada 
and the United States are fi lled with people who, along with their 
descendents, came to the New World in pursuit of liberty. While 
these societies frequently interpret themselves as beacons of liberty 
on the basis of their laws, and were inhabited by those escaping per-
secution and totalitarian terror, the meaning of their ancestors’ suf-
fering and its signifi cance for their liberty have seldom been noted 
and frequently forgotten as the native-born neglect the ancestors’ 
virtues gained through their suffering. The deepest of this suffering 
is done in silence, as is the case perhaps because of the very nature 
of suffering. Even so, such silent suffering has a social and political 
effect. Even though there are notable testaments to the suffering of 
immigrants and refugees, these numerous testaments are objects of 
contemplation and silent witness, but, as an aggregate, have yet to 
bubble up in conversation with one another to help constitute the 
self-interpretation of liberal societies.
It seems to me that the deeper meaning of freedom Walsh elu-
cidates cannot have a fuller public signifi cance until this happens. 
Part of what prevents this conversation from happening derives 
from the Pelagian dimension of the liberal order: conversing about 
suffering sounds like whining, which in many cases it is. As a result, 
when we are moderated of our Pelagianism, Stoicism merely ends 
up the default mode we take as a response to our fragility. But the 
deeper obstacle is in the nature of suffering itself. Indeed it is silent, 
as is our loving response to it, as Kierkegaard, fi rst among the mod-
ern philosophers, notices.
38 See the essays in Civil Religion in Political Thought: Its Perennial Ques-
tions and Enduring Relevance in North America, ed. Ronald Weed and 
John von Heyking (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 
2010).
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Yet, it is Walsh’s insight in Growth of the Liberal Soul that what 
is best in the liberal order is usually silent and inarticulate. It is what 
usually draws liberal societies away from the abyss. Thus, while lib-
eral societies might appear to conduct politics as “civil war by other 
means” (in Alasdair MacIntyre’s words), its tumultuousness is in fact 
restrained by its core. Of course, there are no guarantees.
But of necessity, freedom has no guarantees.
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